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LAW AND BIOETHICS
Alexander Morgan Capron *
Vicki Michel **
"Law and bioethics" differs in several important ways from the
other "law and . . ." topics discussed in this collection. To begin,
"bioethics" itself is less easily defined than the familiar disciplines that
populate the land of academic legal hybrids. In the first section of this
Essay, we describe the domain of bioethics. Next, we compare "law and
bioethics" with other "law and.. ." topics as a means of understanding
the ways in which the law has shaped bioethics and bioethics has come
into legal studies. Finally, we examine legal and ethical issues in certain
end-of-life cases, a topic familiar to students of bioethics but perhaps of
interest to lawyers who are curious about what the field is all about.
I. BioETHics
Bioethics is said to be the field that addresses the ethical problems
posed by modem medicine and biotechnology.' But it is not a single,
distinct academic discipline. As Daniel Callahan noted twenty years ago
and as remains true today: "Most of its practitioners have wandered into
the field from somewhere else, more or less inventing it as they go." 2
Indeed, one of the strengths of the field is that it is interdisciplinary and
has been since its origins, drawing people not only from medicine, philos-
ophy, theology, and law but also from nursing, medical history, medical
anthropology, medical sociology, and related fields. At a conference last
fall on "The Birth of Bioethics," the speakers-who were chosen as "pio-
neers" because they had published articles in the field prior to 1976-
consisted of fourteen physicians, twelve philosophers, eight theologians,
four lawyers, and five from other fields such as medical sociology and
history of medicine, with several holding degrees in more than one field.
* Alexander Morgan Capron is Henry W. Bruce University Professor of Law and
Medicine and Co-Director of the Pacific Center for Health Policy and Ethics at University of
Southern California Law Center.
** Vicki Michel is Associate Director of the Pacific Center for Health Policy and Ethics
at University of Southern California Law Center.
1. John D. Arras, Nancy Rhoden: Exploring the Dark Side of Biomedical Technology, 68
N.C. L. REv. 835, 835 (1990).
2. Daniel Callahan, Bioethics as a Discipline, 1 HASTINGS CENTER STUD. 66, 68 (1973).
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A. When Did the Field Originate?
An argument can be made on more than parochial grounds that the
University of Washington's celebration of "The Birth of Bioethics" was
perfectly timed-the conference was held on the thirtieth anniversary of
the November 1962 publication of Shana Alexander's widely cited Life
article on the "God Committee."3 This group of seven laypersons was
charged with deciding which patients at Swedish Hospital in Seattle,
where chronic hemodialysis was developed, would have access to the still
scarce kidney machines-and also which patients, lacking this treatment,
would die.' The kidney dialysis story typifies much of bioethics in that it
raises problems or dilemmas that arise from the successes of biomedicine.
Indeed, until the recent past, with the frustrations of the AIDS epidemic,
much of bioethics seemed to be generated by the enormous powers of
medicine that began to emerge so clearly by the 1960s-in resuscitation
and intensive care, behavior modification, reproductive techniques, and a
host of other high-tech, high-cost diagnostic and treatment modalities.
In a phrase, bioethics has dealt with the problems of success, not failure.
Other observers might suggest that the principles and many of the
issues that are central to bioethics originated earlier than the 1960s, most
prominently in the standards for research with human subjects embodied
in the "Nuremberg Code" articulated in 1945 by three American jurists
in the course of passing judgment on the physicians who experimented
on prisoners in the Nazi concentration camps.5 Still others might argue
that the many threads that make up bioethics did not really come to-
gether until the late 1960s with, for example, the founding in 1969 in
Hastings-on-Hudson, New York, of the Institute of Society, Ethics and
the.Life Sciences-now formally known by its nickname, The Hastings
Center. Dispute even arises over where and by whom the word
"bioethics" was first used to describe the field-either Sargent Shriver or
Van Renssalaer Potter.6
3. Shana Alexander, They Decide Who Lives, Who Dies, LIFE, Nov. 9, 1962, at 102.
4. Id. at 106.
5. See generally JAY KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS 292-306 (1972);
Medical Case, in 1-2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY
TRIBUNALS (1949).
6. Warren Reich described these alternative theories in his address at the Birth of
Bioethics Conference, on September 23, 1992, in Seattle, Washington, drawing on the recollec-
tions of the Honorable Sargent Shriver and on Van Rensselaer Potter's book on bioethics. It is
thought that Sargent Shriver suggested the term to Andre Hellegers, M.D., in 1971 while Dr.
Hellegers was organizing the Kennedy Institute of Ethics at Georgetown University, which
included a Center on Bioethics. Dr. Potter coined the term "bioethics" to describe the joining
together of biological knowledge and human values to create public policy that would ensure
the survival of the quality of life on earth. See VAN RENSSELAER POTTrER, BIOETHICS:
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At the very least it is clear that by the 1970s, scholars and practi-
tioners from a wide range of fields were working together in a domain
that was no longer adequately described as medical ethics. Beyond mere
concerns of medical etiquette-for example, whether it is proper for a
physician to refer a patient to a practitioner who lacks a medical de-
gree-medical ethics had been oriented, in effect, to the question: "What
would the conscientious, moral physician do under the circumstances?"
Bioethics was premised on the recognition that ethically acceptable solu-
tions to the dilemmas posed by modem medicine-from crafting the
rules that would guide human research to deciding when human life be-
gins and ends to allocating life-saving resources-could be derived only
from a more broadly based analysis, and a more generally legitimated
decision-making mechanism than the choices made by individual physi-
cians, however conscientious.
B. A Multitude of Methods
Bioethics is hard to describe not only because it is not a clearcut
discipline but because it lacks a single, accepted methodology. Philoso-
pher-bioethicists use the methods of philosophy and theologian-
bioethicists use the methods of theology, at least when writing. But
when bioethicists consult in hospitals, exactly what are they doing?-
especially if the "bioethicist" is a physician or lawyer and not a moral
philosopher or theologian. Although it has been suggested that bioethics
rescued moral philosophy,7 bioethics is not simply applied ethics. First,
it is fundamentally interdisciplinary and draws on a variety of under-
standings of biology and the practice of medicine.8 Second, as Barry
Hoffmaster has recently argued, it deals with practical problems in light
of their circumstances and contexts, whereas moral philosophers tradi-
tionally disclaim any special ability to say what is the right thing to do-
although they are willing to say what counts as a good moral reason. 9
BRIDGE TO THE FUTURE (1971). Chapter one of his book is titled "Bioethics, The Science of
Survival." Id. at 1. This is obviously a quite different use of the term than the one that has
become familiar. Dr. Potter was primarily concerned with the environment rather than with
medicine and biotechnology. Id. at 2.
7. Stephen Toulmin, How Medicine Saved the Life of Ethics, 25 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED.
736 (1982).
8. For example, one of us, V.M., is trained as a family therapist, and has found that both
in teaching bioethics and in case consultation, she draws heavily on both the theory and meth-
ods of that field.
9. Barry Hoffmaster, Can Ethnography Save the Life of Medical Ethics?, 35 Soc. Sci. &
MED. 1421 (1992).
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In the last few years, considerable discussion has taken place con-
cerning bioethics methodology-largely in the philosophical rather than
the legal literature, but still important to any understanding of law and
bioethics. Bioethics has traditionally been focused on mid-level ethical
principles such as autonomy, beneficence, justice, and nonmalfeasance.l°
Argumentation at this level is necessary because general agreement is
lacking on a moral theory that would resolve bioethical dilemmas. But
the appeal to mid-level principles has proved no more successful since
most dilemmas arise precisely when conflict occurs among ethical princi-
ples, none of which have an unchallenged claim of priority."
In their 1988 book, The Abuse of Casuistry,2 Albert Jonsen and
Stephen Toulmin challenge this principle-based theory. Drawing on
their experiences as, respectively, a member of and a consultant to the
National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedi-
cal and Behavioral Research in the mid-1970s, the authors assert that
agreement on the solution to bioethical problems comes not by deductive
reasoning from general rules or principles, but rather from a "shared
perception of what was specifically at stake in particular kinds of human
situations."' 3 Jonsen and Toulmin thus promote casuistry-"the analy-
sis and classification of 'cases' and 'circumstances' ""_ as the appropri-
ate methodology for bioethics, based on the claim that "moral knowledge
is essentially particular so that sound resolutions of moral problems must
always be rooted in a concrete understanding of specific cases and cir-
cumstances."' 5 Readily recognizable examples of good and evil, and
right and wrong, provide paradigmatic examples that can then be applied
to new and more complex cases. Jonsen and Toulmin note that philoso-
pher John Arras calls this the common-law ethics model,' 6 and of course
it is a model that probably seems eminently reasonable from the perspec-
tive of lawyers who use it every day.
10. These four principles are often referred to as the "Georgetown Mantra" because they
have been repeatedly articulated by scholars from the Kennedy Institute at Georgetown Uni-
versity. See generally THOMAS BEAUCHAMP & JAMES CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDI-
CAL ETHICS (3d ed. 1989) (describing ethical principles that serve as basis of analysis in field of
bioethics).
11. A key reference work for physicians actually states that the principle of autonomy has
priority, but offers no justification for this contention. ALBERT R. JONSEN ET AL., CLINICAL
ETHICS: A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO ETHICAL DECISIONS IN CLINICAL MEDICINE (2d ed.
1992).
12. ALBERT R. JONSEN & STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE ABUSE OF CASUISTRY: A HISTORY
OF MORAL REASONING (1988).
13. Id. at 18.
14. Id. at 11.
15. Id. at 330.
16. Id.
[Vol. 27:25
LAW AND BIOETHICS
However, as Kevin Wildes notes, it is not clear how paradigms are
selected in the Jonsen-Toulmin model.17 In the medieval practice of cas-
uistry, the paradigms were set in "the disciplinary matrix of Catholic
confessional practice"18 and made sense within that moral tradition.
Wildes doubts any basis exists for assuming a common morality today as
a matrix for paradigm bioethics cases. "The conceptual question for con-
temporary bioethics... is determining who is the moral authority to-
day." 19 He argues that the legitimacy of the Jonsen-Toulmin model is
undermined because they "do not take moral pluralism seriously."20
The problem of moral pluralism plagues every effort to settle on a
satisfactory methodology for bioethics. Tackling this problem directly,
H. Tristram Engelhardt asserts that we meet as "moral strangers"-peo-
ple who do not "share enough of a concrete morality to allow the com-
mon discovery of the basis for the correct resolution of a moral
controversy. '21  This accounts for the centrality of individuals in
bioethics theories. However, even though people lack a shared moral
community,22 they can still "establish a procedural ethic, based on re-
spect of the freedom of the moral agents involved, even without establish-
ing the correctness of any particular moral sense."2
2 3
This tilt toward procedure over substance is familiar-and comfort-
able-for many lawyers in the liberal, democratic tradition, but some
lawyers working in bioethics have nonetheless rejected it. George Annas
has reacted strongly to suggestions that bioethics should concentrate on
acceptable decision-making processes rather than substantive rules. He
recognizes the frustrating nature of the task of defining the latter but says
"it nonetheless strikes me as one that is worthy of law and social policy,
and the only one that can hope to prevent medical law (and medical
ethics) from becoming no more than simply the arbitrary exercise of
power."' 24 But this point is not made in disregard of the problem of
moral pluralism. In fact, Annas ends the introduction to his most recent
17. Kevin W. Wildes, S.J., The Priesthood of Bioethics and the Return of Casuistry, 18 J.
MED. & PHIL. 33, 40 (1993).
18. Id. at 39.
19. Id. at 44.
20. Id. at 45.
21. H. TRISTRAM ENGELHARDT, JR., BIOETHICS AND SECULAR HUMANISM at xiv
(1991).
22. Id. at 135-36.
23. H. TRISTRAM ENGELHARDT, JR., THE FOUNDATIONS OF BIOETHICS 45 (1986).
24. GEORGE J. ANNAS, JUDGING MEDICINE at xiii (1988).
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book with this quotation from Joseph Campbell: "Lawyers and law are
what hold us together. There is no ethos."25
II. LAW AND BIOETHICS
A. Is It Just Health Care Law?
The issues of domain and methods are even more interesting when
the question is enlarged beyond "what is bioethics?" to "what is law and
bioethics?" For example, when law firms offer bioethics consultation as
part of the services they provide, what does this mean?26 If the expertise
being offered is not strictly legal, what is it? And if it is strictly legal,
how does it differ from the rest of health law practice so as to justify
having a name of its own?
In other words, does "law and bioethics" really just refer to a sub-
ject area within law like sports law or entertainment law so that it should
rightly be called bioethics law and not be classified with the "law and
.. " topics? An argument can be made for considering bioethics as sim-
ply a subset of health care law that deals with medical decision making,
genetic and reproductive technology, human subjects research, and the
like. In fact, health law casebooks today typically include chapters or
sections on bioethics.
But this view does not fully capture the means by which bioethics is
generally taught. Long before "health law" emerged as a field separate
from forensic medicine, courses dealing with bioethics were being taught
at law schools, 27 although the first casebook with the title Bioethics and
Law was not published until 1981.28 A sense of what sets the field apart
can be seen in that casebook, in which the first two chapters describe
"the new biology" and recount the dilemmas engendered by modem
medicine and biotechnology, and in which the third chapter, "Managing
the Dilemmas: Ethical Theories," begins: "Virtually all of the dilemmas
and governance problems raised in the preceding chapters pose both legal
25. GEORGE J. ANNAS, STANDARD OF CARE: THE LAW OF AMERICAN BIOETHICS 12
(1993).
26. See, e.g., ARENT Fox KINTNER PLOTKIN & KAHN, LEGAL CONSULTING SERVICES
IN THE FIELD OF BIOETHICS (undated advertising brochure) (on file with Loyola of Los Ange-
les Law Review).
27. For example, Jay Katz, M.D., taught courses on "Experimentation with Human Be-
ings" and "Catastrophic Diseases" at Yale Law School from the mid-1960s, and one of us,
A.M.C., who had taught with Dr. Katz, published (in photocopy form) several editions of a
casebook on "Law and the Life Sciences" that were used at Columbia, Pennsylvania, and Yale
Universities beginning in 1973. This material eventually became one foundation for JUDITH
AREEN ET AL., LAW, SCIENCE, AND MEDICINE (1984).
28. MICHAEL H. SHAPIRO & ROY G. SPECE, JR., BIOETHICS AND LAW (1981).
[Vol. 27:25
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and ethical issues, and thus we are required to deal with 'law and
bioethics.' "29 What follows is a twenty page discussion of ethical theory.
Similarly in Law, Science and Medicine, Section C of the first chapter,
entitled "Values and Uncertainty,"3 includes an eighteen-page excerpt
from an article by philosopher Tom L. Beauchamp, Ethical Theory and
Bioethics.3 1 Thus, when legal academicians teach courses in this field,
they consider grounding in ethical theory central to an understanding of
the subject.
From this one might conclude that law and bioethics is a subset of
law and philosophy.32 But such a characterization would also do the
field an injustice because attention is usually not focused on mastering
philosophical concepts for their own sake but as they relate to under-
standing society's appropriate responses to developments that deeply af-
fect people's lives and relationships. Indeed, while law and bioethics
courses originally relied heavily on nonlegal materials,33 the flood of
cases, statutes, and regulations in recent years makes casebooks in this
field now look more like those in traditional fields. This deluge also
makes law and bioethics of greater interest to legal practitioners.34
29. Id. at 72.
30. AREEN ET AL., supra note 27, at 114.
31. Tom L. Beauchamp, Ethical Theory and Bioethics, in ToM L. BEAUCHAMP & LEROY
WALTERS, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHicS 1, 4-11, 13-24, 26-31 (2d ed. 1982), re-
printed in AREEN ET AL., supra note 27, at 131-48.
32. Indeed, the author of the Essay on law and philosophy in this collection, Professor
Leslie Pickering Francis, does work in bioethics.
33. This is exemplified by the fact that
[w]hen I began teaching "Law and the Life Sciences," most of my course materials
were either from other disciplines, such as sociology and philosophy, or were cases
and statutes that did not deal directly with the life sciences but from which I could
draw analogies by examining the possible application of rules in contracts, criminal
law, constitutional law, or administrative law. For example, we asked, what would
come out of applying Erving Goffman's work on "total institutions" to the hospital-
not just mental institutions but ordinary hospitals? What legal structures would then
be appropriate?
Alexander M. Capron, A "Bioethics" Approach to Teaching Health Law, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC.
505, 506 (1988).
34. Although now there are many opportunities to practice in the specialized field of
bioethics, this was not always the case. For example,
[i]n the early 1970s students would say, "I am very interested in what you're doing,
but where can you recommend that I look for a job after I graduate?".. . Because
there were no firms specializing in "bioethics," even such landmark cases as In re
Quinlan were usually litigated by lawyers who had no special preparation. Since
then opportunities have expanded, and anyone teaching a bioethics approach to the
health care field today can assure students that there are many ways the material will
be relevant in legal practice. Partners at general practice firms-and even more, at
health law firms-now recognize the need for people whose experience goes beyond
reimbursement issues to encompass the philosophical and social subtleties in
bioethics cases.
Id. at 506-07 (footnote omitted).
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B. How Does It Differ from Other "Law and... " Disciplines?
Bioethics and law are entangled in ways that set them apart from
the other "law and . . ." fields. First, it cannot be said that law has
shaped most of the other "law and. . ." disciplines-such as anthropol-
ogy, history, language, literature, sociology, theology, or even the natural
sciences-in any significant way. But a leading bioethicist-lawyer has ar-
gued that "American law, not philosophy or medicine, is primarily re-
sponsible for the agenda, development and current state of American
bioethics."35 For example, it is hard to separate the ethical principle of
autonomy in the bioethics literature from the legal expression of that
principle as "privacy" or "liberty" in the context of judicial decisions on
informed consent or the right to refuse treatment. Indeed, the nonlawy-
ers doing bioethics in the late 1960s and early 1970s often grounded their
advocacy for a transformation of the physician-patient relationship on
the rules developed by courts in the early informed consent cases.3 6
Likewise, the principles and procedures developed by medical associa-
tions and the federal government to ensure respect for the rights and
interests of human beings in biomedical research3" drew on the decision
of the American judges at the Nuremberg Tribunal in sentencing the
Nazi concentration camp doctors.
Reciprocally, bioethics has shaped the law through the introduction
of concepts like proportionality3" or the elaboration of concepts such as
personhood. Furthermore, lawyers and courts have been forced to tackle
bioethical dilemmas. For example, the limited availability of dialysis ma-
chines in the early 1960s led to an increasingly visible struggle with the
problem of choosing the "most worthy" to receive treatment. The spec-
tacle of patients dying for lack of access to a successful therapy proved
too much for Congress, prompting its decision in 1972 to fund all end-
35. ANNAS, supra note 24, at 3.
36. The notion that to be valid, consent must be preceded by a physician's disclosure of
information about what was proposed to be done to a patient was first articulated in Salgo v.
Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957).
37. KATZ, supra note 5, at 312-21, 845-46 (discussing Declaration of Helsinki and other
ethical standards governing biomedical research on human subjects).
38. The notion from Catholic doctrine that otherwise binding obligations become optional
when they create burdens that are disproportionate to their benefits first entered bioethics law
in the famous New Jersey Supreme Court decision In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976), which involved a patient whose wishes were unknown but might
be derived from her Catholic faith. In time, however, this concept progressed from that partic-
ular context-of a Catholic patient-to a generally applicable concept useful in judging not
only a patient's obligations to accept treatment but families' and professionals' obligations to
offer treatment.
[Vol. 27:25
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stage renal disease treatment through the Medicare program. 9 This ar-
guably premature and poorly considered legislative response is an exam-
ple of the law reacting to the development of new medical technology.
The rapid development of biomedical technology has probably made this
reactive posture inevitable, though a central task of law and bioethics
scholarship has been to anticipate needed social responses to biomedical
developments.
The existence of many litigated bioethics cases is a characteristic of
this field that distinguishes it from most of the other "law and.. ." top-
ics. Most of the others are academic disciplines rather than applied or
practical fields, whereas bioethicists as a regular matter see their theories
tested in both court cases and legislation. The field grew out of the prac-
tical realities of the physician-patient relationship, biomedical research,
and the behavior of health care institutions.
Bioethicists have also had a role in the formation of public policy
that is atypical of participants in the other "law and . . ." fields, except
perhaps law and economics. Three national commissions, as well as
myriad other governmental bodies at the state and federal levels, have
dealt with the ethical and social issues raised by research with human
subjects, medical technology and health care.'
C. What Is Taught and Published?
One way to trace the history of a "law and.. ." field is to look at the
legal curriculum as it is described through the course categories men-
tioned in the American Association of Law Schools (AALS) Directory of
Law Teachers. In the 1960s, the index to courses listed simply Law and
Medicine, described as including Health Law and Psychiatry and the
Law. In the 1974-1975 directory, Law and Medicine was changed to
include only Health Law, while Law and Psychiatry was listed sepa-
rately. Law and Medicine was then expanded to include Forensic
Medicine in 1976-1977, and Bioethics a decade later. The following year,
1987-1988, Health Care Law gained a separate listing. Law and Science
has also had a listing, at least since the 1960s.
39. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 2991, 86 Stat. 1329, 1463-
64 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 426-1 (1988)).
40. These commissions were the National Commission for the Protection of Human Sub-
jects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 1974-1978; the President's Commission for the
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 1980-1983;
and the Biomedical Ethics Advisory Committee, 1987-1990. One of us, A.M.C., has served as
consultant to the first commission, executive director of the second, and chair of the third.
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But the AALS directory information turns out not to reflect what
was really being taught. For example, one of us, A.M.C., started teach-
ing a bioethics course called "Law and the Life Sciences" in 1972-1973 at
Pennsylvania, having taught other courses in this area the previous two
years at Yale. Similarly, our colleague Michael Shapiro began teaching a
course at University of Southern California in 1969 called "Law and
Technology" that covered issues in bioethics and environmental law.
But it took nearly twenty years for bioethics to be recognized with so
much as a subheading in the AALS directory.
Another indicator of the development of law and bioethics might be
the listings in the Index to Legal Periodicals (Index). "Medical Jurispru-
dence" is a longstanding category in the Index. In the 1964-1967 cumu-
lative index, most of the entries in this category relate to medical
malpractice, medical evidence, law and psychiatry, and the like. There
are a few articles on consent to or refusal of medical treatment and one
entitled The Legal Rights of the Unborn Child,41 which might be thought
of as falling in law and bioethics territory. However, by the 1967-1970
edition, the Index listed many articles that dealt with bioethics including
abortion, organ transplants, the definition of death, experimentation with
human subjects, and refusal of life-sustaining treatment. Additionally,
42there were several law review symposia on bioethics issues. Thus, the
Index would place the birth of bioethics as a field of academic legal writ-
ing in the late 1960s, which is consistent with the time of the first law
school courses and the founding of the Hastings Center and the Kennedy
Institute. Despite this, however, the Index has never had a subject head-
ing of "bioethics," although since 1987-1988 it has listed "Medical Eth-
ics," which seems odd in that medical ethics seems less connected with
law than bioethics. The literature of law and bioethics is not just found
in law reviews, or for that matter just in scholarly journals of other disci-
plines such as philosophy, but appears also in medical and health policy
journals and in bioethics publications, most notably the Hastings Center
Report and The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics.
One major topic in legal scholarship can legitimately be said to be
part of the law and bioethics literature: abortion. Although much of the
literature on abortion would be classified as straight constitutional law
41. Richard P. Byrne, The Legal Rights of the Unborn Child, 41 L.A. B. BULL. 24 (1965).
42. INDEX TO LEGAL PERIODICALS (1967-70.ed.) (listing Symposium, Reflections on the
New Biology, 15 UCLA L. REV. 267 (1968); The Medical, Moral and Legal Implications of
Recent Medical Advances: A Symposium, 13 VILL. L. REV. 732 (1968); Symposium, Medical
Progress and the Law, 32 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 561 (1967)).
[Vol. 27:25
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analysis, an emerging feminist approach43 is greatly influenced by Carol
Gilligan's work,' which focuses on moral development and the ways in
which women and men resolve moral dilemmas. Given the concern with
how to conceptualize values, it is not surprising that the work of Gilligan
and other feminist moral theorists, such as Nel Noddings, 45 has begun to
show up in the law and bioethics literature. This influence is felt not only
in the subjects dealing directly with women-such as abortion, maternal-
fetal issues, and reproductive technology-but also in less obvious places
like the literature on ethics committees." In fact, one might have ex-
pected this influence to have appeared earlier than it did because the sub-
ject matter of bioethics is largely the relationship between patients and
health caregivers. These relationships would appear to lend themselves
to an analysis grounded in concepts of relationship and connection that
have been central to feminist analysis-in contrast to the dominant ana-
lytic framework of bioethics which has been that of patient autonomy
and rights.
D. Too Much Rights Talk?
For better or worse, law has had a major effect on the way bioethics
is conceptualized and the language in which it is discussed. In large part
because of lawyers-particularly those who think in terms of constitu-
tional law, as Paul Armstrong did when he argued in the New Jersey
courts on behalf of the Quinlan family in 1975-1976-bioethics issues
have been framed in the language of competing rights, whether the issue
is abortion, the so-called maternal-fetal conflict, surrogate motherhood,
or the refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment. An amicus brief fied
in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services47 on behalf of an ad hoc
group, Bioethicists for Privacy,48 argued that Roe v. Wade 4 9 should not
be overruled because the right of privacy it articulated was generally im-
portant to protecting the physician-patient relationship.
43. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan & Daniel R. Ortiz, In a Diffident Voice: Relational Femi-
nism, Abortion Rights, and the Feminist Legal Agenda, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 858 (1993).
44. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982).
45. NEL NODDINGS, CARING: A FEMININE APPROACH TO ETHICS AND MORAL EDUCA-
TION (1984).
46. See Susan M. Wolf, Ethics Committees and Due Process: Nesting Rights in a Commu-
nity of Caring, 50 MD. L. REv. 798 (1991).
47. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
48. Brief for Bioethicists for Privacy as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees at 11-13,
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-605).
49. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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The issues in bioethics are some of the most sensitive and most divi-
sive confronted by our society. We resort to "rights" when non-adver-
sarial solutions seem impossible. As Ronald Dworkin notes, "The
concept of ights... has its most natural use when a political society is
divided, and appeals to cooperation or a common goal are pointless.""0
With the sharp divisions that exist in American society over bioethics
issues and the tendency to take them to court, the formulation of ideas in
terms of rights is thus not surprising. But this is not to say that legal
commentators on bioethics are all attached to rights language and analy-
sis. Many resist over-legalizing the field and recognize that the caregiver-
patient relationship is ideally characterized as intimate and collaborative.
Indeed, one central concern for law and bioethics is to discern the limits
of law as a mechanism to structure concepts and relationships in health
care. In doing this it draws on the traditions of medicine as well as the
insights of philosophy, theology, anthropology, and the like.
Prior to the development of modem medical technology, the rela-
tionship between physician and patient was paternalistic-with the the-
ory being that the doctor would do what was best for the patient, and the
reality being that the doctor could not greatly affect the course of illness.
With the increasing effectiveness of medical interventions, physicians be-
gan to possess some real power to influence their patients' futures, and
that power became the subject of disputes concerning how it was to be
distributed in the physician-patient relationship. Legal commentators
suggested-and most bioethicists embraced-redefinition of that rela-
tionship in terms of patients' rights.5" The dominant place of patients'
rights in law and bioethics theory dismays many health care profession-
als who lament the adversarial tone that they feel the law has introduced
into the practice of medicine. There may be a legitimate complaint here,
but physicians have historically denied that they are making anything
but medical decisions for patients. It has taken bioethicists to point out
that once alternative treatments are available, the choice between them is
usually based on value judgments, not medical judgments, and doctors
have no special expertise that justifies their values taking precedence over
the patient's values. Law and bioethics literature has addressed the prob-
lem of the power imbalance between a vulnerable ill person and a physi-
cian who has control of all the information needed for decision making.
As critical race theory has also made clear, rights are crucial to deal with
power inequality even where our preference would be to conceive of rela-
50. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 184 (1977).
51. See George J. Annas & Joseph M. Healey, Jr., The Patient Rights Advocate: Redefin-
ing the Doctor-Patient Relationship in the Hospital Context, 27 VAND. L. REV. 243, 245 (1974).
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tionships in terms of caring and connection. This tension has been a
recurring theme in law and bioethics, as we hope to make clear by ex-
ploring one of the most contentious areas in the field, decision making
about treatment--especially life-sustaining-for persons who lack pres-
ent decision-making capacity.
III. AN ILLUSTRATION: LIFE SUPPORT FOR NONCOMPETENT
PATIENTS
Decision making for noncompetent persons has been the subject of
numerous state laws providing for advance directives for health care, as
well as the federal Patient Self-Determination Act.52 Additionally,
countless cases from In re Quinlan 53 to Cruzan v. Director, Missouri De-
partment of Health 4 are part of the growing body of law in this area. It
is not surprising, then, that this issue has provoked substantial law re-
view literature as well. The reigning assumption of statutes, cases, and
articles is that individual autonomy is the central principle. Ideally,
every person would write his or her wishes for future care in an advance
directive or otherwise communicate them to family members or an ap-
pointed agent. Legislators and courts have expressed virtually no reser-
vations about this model. In fact, though the Cruzan court was
unwilling to give constitutional protection to family decision making on
behalf of incompetent patients, it indicated in dictum that a competent
patient's decision to forgo life-prolonging treatment could not be over-
ruled by the state.55 Justice O'Connor went further and-reflecting state
statutes and cases-suggested that the choice made by a duly appointed
health care agent would enjoy the same constitutional protection.56
Yet a review of the literature tells a much more interesting story.
The conversation among bioethics scholars has reflected differences in
the way people imagine their control over the course of their lives.
Although grounded in the need for a way to decide legal cases, the dis-
cussion is dominated by philosophical and psychological rather than
legal concepts.
In 1986 Rebecca Dresser published an article which was, as she put
it, "a critique of the legal principles currently governing decisions on life-
52. Patient Self-Determination Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388-115
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
53. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
54. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
55. Id. at 278.
56. Id. at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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sustaining treatment for incompetent patients.""7 She identified the pre-
dominant view as one that sees the best treatment decision as one that is
most consistent with a patient's "formerly articulated beliefs, values, and
goals""8 because this preserves the patient's right of self-determination.
Yet this focus on past preferences relies on a simple, but not necessarily
correct, assumption: "If we can identify what the formerly competent
patient once wanted, we will know what she would want in her present
incompetent state."'5 9 This assumption may not hold up because people
may change their views about what constitutes an acceptable life in the
face of illness or disability; relying on earlier statements might not "max-
imize their current interests as incompetent patients."'  The theory of
personal identity put forth by philosopher Derek Parfit suggests that a
person may not in fact be the same person throughout his or her life in
the absence of psychological continuity from one time to another.6 1 In-
stead of attempting to discover the past preferences of a formerly compe-
tent person who has now become a new incompetent person, Dresser
proposed determining the patient's present best interests through discov-
ery of "how these patients actually experience their lives."
'62
The major counter arguments to the Dresser critique were first put
forward by the late Nancy Rhoden.63 She advocated a presumption in
favor of decision making by close family members in situations where an
incompetent patient has not expressed his or her wishes when competent.
Rhoden did not, however, adopt the rationale for family decision making
first articulated by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Quinlan-namely,
that the right of the patient to decide has not been extinguished merely
because the patient is incapable of exercising it; the right will instead be
57. Rebecca Dresser, Life, Death and Incompetent Patients: Conceptual Infirmities and
Hidden Values in the Law, 28 ARiz. L. REv. 373, 374 (1986).
58. Id at 375.
59. Id. at 379.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 380-81.
62. Id. at 390. This challenge to the general view-and its legislative manifestation in
advance directive statutes-was continued in subsequent publications. See Rebecca Dresser,
Relitigating Life and Death, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 425 (1990); Rebecca S. Dresser & John A.
Robertson, Quality of Life and Non-Treatment Decisions for Incompetent Patients: A Critique
of the Orthodox Approach, 17 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 234 (1989).
63. Nancy K. Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARV. L. REv. 375 (1988) [herein-
after Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death]. Two subsequent articles were also written at least
partially in response to Dresser. See Nancy K. Rhoden, How Should We View the Incompe-
tent?, 17 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 264 (1989); Nancy K. Rhoden, The Limits of Legal
Objectivity, 68 N.C. L. REV. 845 (1990) [hereinafter Rhoden, The Limits of Legal Objectivity].
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exercised by the family member as surrogate decision maker." Rhoden's
preference for family choice, as she puts it, "can be gleaned from history,
from society's respect for the family, and from the fact that family deci-
sionmaking best embodies patient preferences." 6 On the assumption
that physicians tend to favor continued treatment of critically ill patients
and courts tend to defer to physician judgments, her proposal would shift
the burden of proof to the physician to show that the family's choice was
unreasonable. 6
Rhoden's focus on who will make the treatment decision rather than
on how substantively the decision will be made is the opposite of
Dresser's. However, Rhoden also responded directly to Dresser, arguing
that patients' clear prior directives should be followed since "a compe-
tent person who makes a living will does so because she sees her interests
and values as continuing in time."'67 Rhoden points out that Derek
Parfit's view, upon which Dresser relies, "conflicts with the ordinary so-
cial, moral and legal ways in which we view persons."6 8 Even if one does
not accept Parfit's extreme view on personal identity, Rhoden claims that
Dresser "makes a serious mistake by insisting on viewing a person only
in a highly restricted slice of time."61 9 Instead, Rhoden draws on Ronald
Dworkin's defense of advance directives, in which he "notes that we can
think of a demented person either as she is in the present only, or as a
person who has become demented, a view that takes into account the
larger context of her life." 70
We have obviously vastly oversimplified the conversation between
Dresser and Rhoden, a conversation that has included lawyers John
Robertson and Norman Cantor and philosophers Allan Buchanan and
Dan Brock. These writers have all to one degree or another found the
reasoning of the courts about decision making for incompetent patients
unsatisfactory and have tried to offer alternative approaches that draw on
64. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). In fact,
Nancy Rhoden objects to attributing a right to incompetent patients that they lack all capacity
to exercise. Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, supra note 63, at 388.
65. Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, supra note 63, at 437.
66. Id. at 441.
67. Id. at 410. She elaborates on this in a later article where she says: "Prior directives
are the tools for projecting one's moral and spiritual values into the future." Rhoden, The
Limits of Legal Objectivity, supra note 63, at 858.
68. Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, supra note 63, at 414.
69. Id. at 415.
70. Id. (citing Ronald Dworkin, Autonomy and the Demented Self, 64 MILBANK Q. 4, 4
(Supp. 2 1986)).
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philosophical theory as well as the realities of medical practice.7 Still
further dimensions have been added by the explorations of psychoanalyt-
ically oriented scholars such as Robert Burt and Jay Katz, both of whom
delve into the psychology of the caregiver-patient relationship and its re-
lationship to the law.72
The ongoing nature of this particular debate on law and bioethics
can be seen in the recent suggestion by philosopher Jeffrey Blustein that
the characteristics of families identified by Rhoden as justifying a pre-
sumption in favor of family decision making for incompetent patients
"also provide good reasons for family involvement in the competent pa-
tients' thinking about choices."" Blustein, however, does not suggest
changing legal rules to mandate or even facilitate such involvement, but
rather, recommends changes in medical practice.74 Yet his reliance on
Rhoden's article is a reminder of the absence of a sharp boundary be-
tween legal and nonlegal bioethics literature, and of the ways in which
the practical problems of clinical medicine, the findings of biology and
psychology, the insights of philosophy, and further contributions from
other disciplines combine with legal doctrine and theory to make "law
and bioethics" a particularly rich and complex field.
71. See, e.g., ALLEN W. BUCHANAN & DAN W. BROCK, DECIDING FOR OTHERS: THE
ETHICS OF SURROGATE DECISION MAKING (1989); Norman L. Cantor, Prospective Autonomy:
On the Limits of Shaping One's Postcompetence Medical Fate, 8 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 13 (1992); John A. Robertson, Cruzan and the Constitutional Status of Nontreatment
Decisions for Incompetent Patients, 25 GA. L. REV. 1139 (1991).
72. ROBERT A. BURT, TAKING CARE OF STRANGERS (1979); JAY KATZ, THE SILENT
WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984).
73. Jeffrey Blustein, The Family in Medical Decisionmaking, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
May-June 1993, at 6, 12.
74. See id.
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